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NOTE
Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the
Dodd–Frank Act
Samuel C. Leifer*
In 2008, the United States fell into its worst economic recession in over seventy
years. In response, Congress enacted the near-comprehensive Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Section 922 of
Dodd–Frank, in particular, includes specific provisions designed to incentivize
and protect corporate whistleblowers. These provisions demonstrated Con-
gress’s belief that a comprehensive and robust whistleblower protection scheme
was essential to preventing many of the abuses that caused the financial crisis.
Unfortunately, this section’s inconsistent language has produced conflicting
decisions within the federal judiciary. In accordance with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”)’s own reading of Section 922, several district
courts have held that individuals engaging in “whistleblower activities” are
entitled to Dodd–Frank’s antiretaliation protections, irrespective of whether
these individuals report directly to the SEC or report through internal chan-
nels in their own companies. In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has limited Dodd–Frank’s whistleblowing protections to individ-
uals who report directly to the SEC. This Note contends that remedial legisla-
tion like Dodd–Frank should be broadly interpreted to further its purpose,
that a broad interpretation of Section 922 is consistent with the text, structure,
and legislative history of Dodd–Frank, and that courts unable to resolve the
apparent conflict in this section should defer to the SEC’s administrative ex-
pertise and interpretation.
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Introduction
When the United States’ housing market collapsed in 2008, it sent the
country into its worst financial state since the Great Depression. Academics,
politicians, and the media have suggested various causes of and potential
remedies for the collapse. But while many of the causes and remedies for this
particular recession may be novel, the general pattern of a financial collapse
followed by increased financial regulations is quite familiar. The United
States has suffered many severe financial setbacks in the last century, and
each time the federal government’s response has included some form of pro-
posed regulatory solution: the introduction of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 following the Great Depression;1 the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002 (“SOX”) following the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and sev-
eral other prominent corporations;2 and the implementation of the
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp (2012)).
2. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
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Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd–Frank”) following the most recent financial crisis.3
In recent years, Congress has endorsed the role of whistleblowers in
preventing or mitigating the kinds of financial improprieties that can lead to
economic chaos. Accordingly, Congress has incorporated whistleblower pro-
tection provisions into its remedial legislation. SOX was the first of these
regulatory responses to include comprehensive protections and incentives
for corporate whistleblowers. Although there is considerable empirical evi-
dence to suggest that SOX’s whistleblowing program was unsuccessful,4 the
subsequent introduction of stronger and more expansive whistleblower
measures in Dodd–Frank reiterated Congress’s belief that whistleblowers
play an important role in financial regulation.
Despite this unambiguous congressional goal, however, the statutory
language of both SOX and Dodd–Frank remains ambiguous as to precisely
who can receive these whistleblower protections. Whereas SOX was unclear
about which individuals within an organization are entitled to whistleblower
protections (for example, direct employees of a company versus employees
of a company’s contractors),5 Dodd–Frank’s ambiguity concerns what ac-
tions an individual must take in order to receive whistleblower protections.
The heart of the Dodd–Frank debate stems from an internal inconsis-
tency in the way that the statute defines “whistleblower.” Section 922 of
Dodd–Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding Sec-
tion 21F (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6), a new section that includes en-
hanced protections and incentives for securities whistleblowers.6 Within
Section 922, § 78u-6(a)(6) (the Definitions Section) explicitly defines a
whistleblower as an individual who reports a potential violation to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),7 but § 78u-6(h)(1) (the An-
tiretaliation Section)8 includes protections for individuals who report
directly to the SEC as well as for individuals who report internally, through
their own company’s compliance systems.9 This has created disagreement
among the courts regarding whether Dodd–Frank antiretaliation protections
3. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15,
22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
4. See infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.
6. Dodd–Frank Act § 922(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)) (“The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . is amended by inserting . . . the following: ‘Sec. 21F. Securities
Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.’ ”).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual
who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission,
in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”).
8. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1). This provision is formally called “Prohibition against retaliation.”
Id. I will refer to it as the “Antiretaliation Section” for purposes of clarity.
9. Id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (“No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by
the whistleblower—(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this
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should be limited to individuals who report directly to the SEC (external
whistleblowers) or should include individuals who report through their
companies (internal whistleblowers). Antiretaliation protections can give
whistleblowers the security and confidence they need to report potential vio-
lations, and such protections can also deter companies from committing
these violations in the first place. Studies have demonstrated that a majority
of corporate whistleblowing is done internally10 and that internal
whistleblowing provides numerous advantages over external whistleblow-
ing.11 Accordingly, resolving this dispute is crucial to the long-term effective-
ness of Dodd–Frank.
District courts in New York, Connecticut, Colorado, and Tennessee have
interpreted the statute broadly to protect both internal and external
whistleblowers.12 The SEC has adopted a similar reading.13 In contrast, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Dodd–Frank’s
whistleblowing protections more narrowly, limiting protection only to those
individuals who report potential violations directly to the SEC.14
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address Section 922 directly, it
has provided some guidance on interpreting ambiguities in remedial legisla-
tion. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, the Court held that remedial
legislation—specifically, securities regulations—should be broadly and flexi-
bly interpreted.15 Consistent with Herman, then, this Note contends that
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblowing protections should be interpreted broadly to
include individuals reporting externally to the SEC as well as those individu-
als reporting internally “under . . . any other law, rule, or regulation subject
to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].”16
Part I details the history of SOX and Dodd–Frank, highlighting the re-
medial nature of both of these statutes and underscoring that Dodd–Frank’s
whistleblower measures were meant to be an expansion and enhancement of
SOX’s program. Part II introduces the split between the Fifth Circuit and the
district courts of other circuits and discusses the differing rationales behind
both the broad and narrow interpretations of “whistleblower” in
Dodd–Frank. Part II also argues that the district courts’ rationales for inter-
preting Section 922 broadly comport with the remedial purposes animating
section; (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or adminis-
trative action of the Commission based upon or related to such information; or (iii) in making
disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”).
10. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 Am. Bus. L.J. 267, 301
(1991) (citing studies).
11. These advantages are detailed infra in Section I.A.1 as well as in the Conclusion of
this Note.
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
15. 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
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Dodd–Frank and should prevail over the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpreta-
tion, which is unpersuasive and incorrect. Part III asserts that Dodd–Frank’s
text, structure, and legislative history counsel in favor of interpreting the Act
in accordance with Herman’s principles on remedial legislation. Ultimately,
this Note concludes that because Dodd–Frank and its whistleblower protec-
tion provisions are remedial in nature, courts should interpret ambiguous
sections as broadly and flexibly as the text permits.
I. A Cycle of Financial Collapses and Subsequent Remedial
Financial Regulation
Many of the most sweeping pieces of financial regulation in the United
States over the past century can be viewed as remedial legislative responses
to a series of severe market collapses17: the Securities Exchange Act in 1934
in response to the market instability of the 1920s and 1930s;18 SOX in 2002
after the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and several other prominent
corporations;19 and Dodd–Frank in 2010 in response to the financial col-
lapse of 2008.20 These statutes all share a common purpose: to remedy a
perceived problem in the financial sector.21 The remedial nature of
Dodd–Frank is paramount in resolving questions of statutory interpretation
because the Supreme Court has specifically held that remedial statutes
should be given broad and expansive interpretations.22 Section I.A details the
history of SOX and the introduction of federal whistleblower protections.
Section I.B explains Dodd–Frank as a response to the 2008 financial crisis
and asserts that Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protections were designed to
remedy the causes of this most recent crisis, to enhance the existing protec-
tions in SOX, and to reaffirm Congress’s intent that financial regulations
should include a robust corporate whistleblower protection scheme.
17. Recent Legislation, Congress Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected
Violations to the SEC, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1829, 1832 (2011); see also Dorit Samuel, The Sub-
prime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid Future Financial Debacles?, 2 Alb.
Gov’t L. Rev. 217, 223–29 (2009) (“Financial crises, of varying severity, have been a recurring
historical phenomenon.”).
18. See Zachary Karabell, The Man Who Called the Credit Crunch, Newsweek (Jan. 9,
2009), http://www.newsweek.com/man-who-called-credit-crunch-78053.
19. See id.
20. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 91,
96 (2012) (“The Dodd-Frank Act was the government’s historic response to the causes of the
economic crisis.”).
21. For example, SOX took “a new approach to [financial] regulation that relie[d] on
internal monitoring, reporting, and problem solving.” Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech
Rights and Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1245,
1251 (2009).
22. Morefield, Case No. 2004-SOX-00002, 2004 WL 5030303, at *2 (Dep’t of Labor Jan.
28, 2004) (“[I]t does not serve the purposes or policies of [SOX] to take too pinched a view of
this remedial statute when it comes to protecting those in an organization who can address the
concerns Congress sought to correct.”); see also Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehen-
sive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2005) (contending
that remedial statutes should be interpreted broadly).
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A. Sarbanes–Oxley: A New Commitment to Whistleblower Protections
In 2001, large companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco became
well known for engaging in accounting fraud and other corrupt and abusive
business practices. The companies used a variety of fraudulent tactics to
misrepresent their financial solvency, hide debt, and deceive investors and
shareholders.23 Congress enacted SOX to respond to the public’s anger to-
ward these companies and to remedy perceived weaknesses in the laws that
supposedly provided checks against corrupt corporate practices.24 One of the
primary policy goals of SOX was to establish both internal and external sys-
tems to identify and quickly fix potential securities violations (such as sub-
mitting fraudulent reports to the SEC).25 To accomplish this goal, SOX was
passed to provide protections and incentives for corporate whistleblowers.26
1. Sarbanes–Oxley Introduces Internal Whistleblower Protections
SOX represented an affirmation of Congress’s commitment to expand
and enhance state whistleblowing laws, which had already begun to emerge
throughout the United States during the 1980s and 1990s27 through protec-
tions at the federal level.28 SOX has three whistleblower sections, but for the
purposes of this Note the most significant is Section 806.29 This section con-
tains SOX’s antiretaliation protections, which forbid companies covered by
23. See, e.g., Andrew Backover & Thor Valdmanis, WorldCom Scandal Brings Subpoenas,
Condemnation, USA Today, June 28, 2002, at A1; Nancy Dillon, SEC Sets New Tyco Probe,
Transactions Targeted, CFO May Be on the Way Out, N.Y. Daily News, June 12, 2002, at 53; C.
Bryson Hull, Once Mighty Enron Now a Step from the Abyss, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov.
29, 2001, at E8; Richard A. Oppel Jr., House Panel’s Investigation of Global Crossing Is Started,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2002, at C2; The Rise and Fall of WorldCom, USA Today, Apr. 19, 2004,
at B5.
24. Vaughn, supra note 22, at 2.
25. See Megan Foscaldi, Recent Development, Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 486, 492 (2012).
26. Although empirical studies suggest that these protections and incentives were not
particularly effective in encouraging or protecting corporate whistleblowers. See infra notes
40–43 and accompanying text.
27. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 99, 99–115 (2000).
28. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1757, 1758
(2007) (“[SOX] represents a reification by the [U.S.] Congress of the importance of
whistleblowing in the control, detection, and deterrence of wrongdoing.”).
29. The other whistleblower-related sections in SOX are Section 1107 and Section 301.
Section 1107 amended the Obstruction of Justice Statute by creating criminal penalties for
whistleblower retaliation. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1107, 116 Stat.
745, 810 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012)) (“Whoever knowingly, with the intent to
retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person . . . for providing to a law enforcement officer
any truthful information relating to the commission . . . of any Federal offense, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”). Section 301 requires compa-
nies to create audit committees with internal procedures through which employees can pro-
vide complaints about questionable accounting or auditing. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
§ 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (2012) (“Each audit committee shall establish procedures for
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SOX to “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other man-
ner discriminate against an employee” for engaging in protected
whistleblowing activities.30 SOX extends these antiretaliation protections to
individuals who report to “(A) . . . Federal regulatory or law enforcement
agenc[ies]; (B) . . . Member[s] or . . . committees of Congress; or (C) . . .
person[s] with supervisory authority over the employee.”31
This expansive array of options for corporate whistleblowers in Section
806 is important for two reasons. First, Section 806 demonstrates a strong
congressional commitment to whistleblower protections. Senator Leahy, one
of the key supporters of the whistleblower protections in SOX, stressed the
importance of strong whistleblower protections while commenting on the
Conference Committee Report.32 Second, SOX marks a departure from most
existing state and federal whistleblower regulations, which primarily protect
only external disclosures.33 Section 806 specifically provides whistleblower
protections to employees of publicly traded companies who report acts of
fraud externally to authorized federal officials as well as to those employees
who report internally to supervisors or appropriate individuals within their
own companies.34
There are several potential reasons why Congress may have included
protections for internal whistleblowers in SOX. In the case of Enron, for
example, the key whistleblowing actions came from internal reporting.
When the vice president of Corporate Development at Enron, Sherron Wat-
kins, reported her concerns about the company’s potentially fraudulent ac-
tions to the CEO, Ken Lay, the company discussed firing Watkins.35
Watkins’s actions have been criticized for not being transparent or timely
enough to count as “whistleblowing”;36 had stronger whistleblower protec-
tions (particularly internal protections) existed at that time, however, she
might have been more willing fully and promptly to report her concerns. In
light of Enron’s implosion and the absence of meaningful whistleblowing at
. . . the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issue concerns regarding
questionable accounting or audit manners.”).
30. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
31. Id. §§ 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C) (emphasis added) (demonstrating SOX’s antiretaliation
protections for internal whistleblowers specifically in section (C)).
32. 148 Cong. Rec. 14,447 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“[W]e include
meaningful protection[ ] for . . . whistleblowers as passed by the Senate. We learned from
Sherron Watkins[, Vice President] of Enron[,] that these corporate insiders are the key wit-
nesses that need to be encouraged to report fraud and help prove it in court. . . . There is no
way that we could have known about [the machinations of corporate officials] without that
kind of a whistleblower.”).
33. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 1760 (“Section 806 is unusual in specifying internal
whistleblowing as an appropriate channel. Most state and federal statutes designate only an
external recipient.”).
34. 148 Cong. Rec. 14,448–50 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
35. Vaughn, supra note 22, at 60 n.225 (“[A]ttorneys for the company submitted a mem-
orandum setting out how Watkins could be fired.”).
36. See Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, but Blew It, Forbes (Feb. 14, 2002,
3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html.
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the company, it is understandable that Congress would draft legislation en-
couraging and protecting internal whistleblowing in the future. Congress
may have also considered that most reporting is done internally and there-
fore sought to create broad protections to avoid discouraging any form of
whistleblowing.37 Individuals may feel more confident and be more willing
to report internally because such reporting demonstrates their loyalty to the
organization. A third theory is that Congress recognized that internal
whistleblowing permits companies to remedy violations quickly and confi-
dentially, minimizing misunderstanding and preventing the erosion of pub-
lic confidence.38 This makes it less likely that companies will suffer losses
(due to weary investors and unstable or declining stock prices) or that em-
ployees will be unfairly punished or fired for merely discovering potential
violations and prudently attempting to remedy them.39 Thus, both compa-
nies and Congress have strong incentives to provide in-house remedies for
violations. Whatever the rationale, SOX exemplified Congress’s commitment
to a robust whistleblower protection scheme with specific protections for
internal whistleblowers. Unfortunately, in practice, SOX’s whistleblower
protections have had more bark than bite.
2. Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblowing Protections Have Been Ineffective
Empirical research suggests that SOX’s whistleblower protections have
neither effectively encouraged whistleblowers nor consistently rewarded
them for their whistleblowing actions. A detailed 2010 study found that in-
stead of supporting employee whistleblowing activity, SOX might have actu-
ally inhibited it.40 After SOX was introduced, the percentage of
whistleblowers who were employees of the violating companies actually
dropped from 18.4% to 13.2%,41 and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (the federal agency charged with handling SOX whistle-
blower complaints) initially resolved only “3.6% of cases . . . in favor of
complaining employees.”42 Another study found that of the “677 completed
37. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 1760 (“[I]nternal reporting is the most common type of
initial whistleblowing.”).
38. Id. For example, in cases where a securities violation was a simple accounting over-
sight rather than an intentional flouting of securities laws, internal reporting allows companies
to avoid misunderstandings with the SEC. See id. But internal reporting “may also allow for
cover-ups, as happened in some of the . . . scandals” discussed supra in this Section. Id.
39. See id.
40. See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. Fin.
2213, 2250 (2010).
41. Id. at 2249–50 (comparing the percentage of whistleblowers pre- and post-SOX by
their various occupations: employees of the violating company, SEC employees, auditors, me-
dia, etc.).
42. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 73, 84. For
a detailed analysis of why SOX claims tended to lose, see Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Ex-
pectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 65 (2007).
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Sarbanes–Oxley complaints, 499 were dismissed and 95 were withdrawn
. . . . Of the cases that went to an administrative law judge . . . only 6 (two
percent) of the 286 resulted in a decision for the employee.”43
There are several potential explanations for SOX’s failure to encourage
and protect more corporate whistleblowers. First, the antiretaliation provi-
sion in SOX originally provided only a very short ninety-day window during
which terminated employees could file a claim.44 It is possible that many
potential claimants did not learn of their rights under SOX in such a short
period and so were statutorily barred from submitting a claim.45 Second, the
remedies and incentives provided may not have been particularly tempting,
especially to employees who were aware of SOX but were unsure of whether
it was worthwhile to become a whistleblower. Although strongly worded
floor speeches suggest that Congress intended to provide sufficient incen-
tives to encourage corporate whistleblowers,46 the actual statutory relief only
guarantees “reinstatement with the same seniority[,] . . . back pay, with in-
terest[, and] . . . compensation for any special damages [resulting from] the
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees and reasonable
attorney fees.”47 This simply may not have been enough to incentivize em-
ployees to disclose violations, especially considering the perceived fear of
retribution from their employers if they did elect for reinstatement. Finally,
the procedural complexities of filing a claim could have either discouraged
or prevented potential claimants from utilizing SOX’s protections.48
Whatever the reasons, SOX did not spur the levels of whistleblowing activity
that members of Congress like Leahy probably had in mind when Congress
first passed the bill.49
B. Dodd–Frank: A Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and to
Sarbanes–Oxley’s Ineffective Protections
During the 2000s, subprime lending and the mortgage securitization
business created much uncertainty and systemic risk throughout the finan-
cial sector. Subprime lenders provided loans to borrowers who could not
qualify for the standard (prime) interest rates because of their poor credit
43. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 1764–65.
44. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, § 806(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 803 (“An
action . . . shall be commenced not later than 90 days after the date on which the violation
occurs.”), amended by Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
(Dodd–Frank) Act, § 922(c), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010) (striking “90”
and inserting “180,” codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (2012)).
45. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 1763.
46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2012).
48. Under SOX, a whistleblower must first file a complaint with the secretary of labor
and can only file an action in district court if the secretary has not issued a decision within 180
days of the original complaint. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1).
49. See Moberly, supra note 42, at 74 (“Sarbanes–Oxley failed to fulfill the great expecta-
tions generated by the Act’s purportedly strong anti-retaliation protections.”).
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histories. These loans and mortgages were then bundled into mortgage-
backed securities and traded on the financial markets. As borrowers began to
default on their loans, financial institutions realized that these securities had
far less value than anticipated.50 In response to this realization, financial in-
stitutions attempted to hide the diminishing value of their mortgage-backed
holdings,51 contributing significantly to what would become the worst finan-
cial collapse in the United States since the Great Depression.52
In response to the market collapse of 2008 and the multitude of bank
failures that followed,53 Congress considered whether regulatory reform was
needed. As with its response to previous financial crises, Congress passed
remedial legislation—this time in the form of Dodd–Frank.54 The 848-page
comprehensive regulatory package55 demonstrated Congress’s belief (or, at
least, its response to the public’s belief) that “financial institutions cannot be
left to regulate themselves, and that without clear rules, transparency, and
accountability, financial markets break down, sometimes catastrophically.”56
Like SOX, Dodd–Frank reaffirmed Congress’s commitment to protecting
corporate whistleblowers.
President Obama signed Dodd–Frank into law on July 21, 2010.57 When
passed, Dodd–Frank evinced congressional support for strong whistleblower
protections. As Senator Cardin remarked, “The whistleblower protections
that are extended in this legislation will allow employees to come forward
with information without fear of retribution by their employer. It is a very
important provision, and I am glad it was included in the final legislation.”58
50. For a concise explanation of the events described above, see Todd M. Galante &
Antonio Gutierrez, The Subprime Meltdown and Its Arrival in the Courtroom, N.J. Law., Feb.
2008, at 44.
51. E.g., SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose from the
Financial Crisis, U.S. SEC (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-
fc.shtml#keyStatistics (“SEC charged Walter A. Morales and his Baton Rouge-based firm with
defrauding investors by hiding millions of dollars in losses suffered during the financial crisis
from investments tied to residential mortgage-backed securities. . . . SEC charged two former
Bear Stearns Asset Management portfolio managers for fraudulently misleading investors
about the financial state of the firm’s two largest hedge funds and their exposure to subprime
mortgage-backed securities before the collapse of the funds in June 2007. . . . SEC charged
entities and executives with making misleading statements to investors in marketing a mutual
fund heavily invested in mortgage-backed and other risky securities.”).
52. See Barr, supra note 20, at 92.
53. There were 25 bank failures in 2008, 140 in 2009, and 157 in 2010. Bank Failures in
Brief: 2008, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2008/index.html (last updated
Jan. 2, 2014); Bank Failures in Brief: 2009, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/
2009/index.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2014); Bank Failures in Brief: 2010, FDIC, http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2010/index.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2014).
54. Recent Legislation, supra note 17, at 1832 (“SOX, like Dodd–Frank, was passed in
response to a financial crisis . . . .”).
55. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
56. Barr, supra note 20, at 92.
57. Dodd–Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 2223.
58. 156 Cong. Rec. S5872 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin).
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For his part, Leahy, who, again, was a principal author of the whistleblower
protection provisions, repeatedly affirmed his own unambiguous support.59
Demonstrating Congress’s continued commitment to a robust corpo-
rate whistleblower protection scheme, Dodd–Frank includes a wide variety
of measures to strengthen both the protections and incentives for corporate
whistleblowers.60 Dodd–Frank offers considerably greater financial incen-
tives for whistleblowers than does SOX. Whistleblowers under Dodd–Frank
can recover double back pay,61 as opposed to back pay with interest under
SOX.62 Dodd–Frank also provides a longer statute of limitations for poten-
tial claimants to file claims—up to six years after the violation itself or three
years after discovering the violation (provided the claim is brought within
ten years of the actual violation).63 Finally, Dodd–Frank eases some of the
procedural hurdles of SOX by creating a direct private right of action;
whistleblowers can now file a complaint directly in district court without
first filing a complaint with the Department of Labor and then having to
wait for a ruling.64
Yet even though these and other provisions in Dodd–Frank65 demon-
strate Congress’s commitment to expanding and strengthening corporate
whistleblower protections, Congress was far less precise regarding whom it
intended these new provisions to protect.
II. Individuals Do Not Need to Report Directly to the SEC in
Order to Merit Dodd–Frank’s Antiretaliation
Protections
The confusion surrounding which individuals are entitled to
whistleblower protection under Dodd–Frank stems from a conflict in the
text of Section 922, the whistleblower protection provision itself. Section
II.A explains the ambiguity and conflict in Section 922: the Definitions Sec-
tion allows only individuals reporting externally to the SEC to be considered
59. 156 Cong. Rec. S5913 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(“As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I am particularly pleased that the confer-
ence report also includes provisions I authored, working with Senator Grassley, Senator Spec-
ter, and Senator Kaufman, to . . . protect whistleblowers who help uncover these crimes.”).
60. 156 Cong. Rec. S5929 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd) (“The
Congress intends that the SEC make awards that are sufficiently robust to motivate potential
whistleblowers to share their information and to overcome the fear of risk of the loss of their
positions. Unless the whistleblowers come forward, the Federal Government will not know
about the frauds and misconduct.”).
61. Relief for successful Dodd–Frank claims includes reinstatement with the same se-
niority status, double back pay, and compensation for litigation costs. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-
6(h)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2012).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B).
63. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
64. Compare Recent Legislation, supra note 17, at 1831, with 18 U.S.C. 1514A(b)(1).
65. For a more complete breakdown of the whistleblower enhancements in Dodd–Frank,
see Recent Legislation, supra note 17, at 1833–34.
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Dodd–Frank whistleblowers, but the Antiretaliation Section grants protec-
tions to individuals reporting externally or internally within their own com-
pany. Section II.B then outlines the decisions of the various district courts
interpreting Section 922 broadly and resolving the conflict by granting
Dodd–Frank antiretaliation protections to both internal and external
whistleblowers. Finally, Section II.C analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s recent deci-
sion to interpret Section 922 narrowly and restrict the antiretaliation protec-
tions to cover only external whistleblowers. This Section argues that the
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning behind this interpretation ultimately proves unper-
suasive. Throughout Part II, this Note points out that even though each
court engages in an extensive statutory analysis, none focuses on the reme-
dial purpose of Section 922 or of Dodd–Frank more generally. Nor do the
courts consider the Supreme Court’s guidance in Herman.
A. The Ambiguous Definition of “Whistleblower”
The Definitions Section declares that a whistleblower is “any individual
who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to
the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the [SEC].”66 In
isolation, this definition indicates that individuals are only whistleblowers
under Dodd–Frank if they report directly to the SEC.67 But the Antiretalia-
tion Section of Dodd–Frank specifically states that employers cannot dis-
charge whistleblowers who provide “information to the Commission” or
who make “disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 . . . [or] any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.”68 Because SOX protects whistleblowers
who report internally to an employee with “supervisory authority” in their
own company,69 the Antiretaliation Section can be read to protect both ex-
ternal and internal whistleblowers.
These two sections create an obvious problem: the Antiretaliation Sec-
tion, which allows for internal reporting, seems to conflict with the Defini-
tions Section, which refers only to external reporting.70 This textual
inconsistency has been litigated in several federal courts, and those courts
have adopted one of two approaches. On the one hand, some courts have
interpreted Section 922 broadly, holding that Dodd–Frank affords
whistleblower protections to individuals regardless of whether they report
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
67. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that
the plain language of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower protection provision creates a private
cause of action only for individuals who provide information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the SEC).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
69. Bradford K. Newman & Shannon S. Sevey, Protections for Whistleblowers Under
Sarbanes–Oxley, Prac. Law., Apr. 2005, at 39, 41.
70. Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 n.9 (M.D. Tenn.
2012).
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directly to the SEC or through their companies’ internal compliance pro-
grams.71 On the other hand, some courts have interpreted the section nar-
rowly and held that individuals are only entitled to whistleblower
protections if they report their concerns directly to the SEC.72 As detailed
infra in Sections II.B and II.C, although each of the courts makes persuasive
arguments for its own interpretive solution to this ambiguity (based either
on text, structure, or deference to the SEC), all of their decisions fail to focus
on the purpose behind Dodd–Frank and the guidance that the Supreme
Court provided in Herman.
B. The District Courts’ Broad Interpretation of Dodd–Frank’s
Whistleblower Protection Provision
Five district courts have considered the scope of Dodd–Frank
whistleblower protections in Section 922. The first two courts only ad-
dressed the issue in dicta,73 but in several more recent decisions, three dis-
trict courts reached the issue in their holdings.74 The courts’ rationales for
their interpretations varied: some courts used the basic tools of statutory
construction while others deferred to the SEC’s interpretation. Regardless of
their interpretive methods, however, the courts all found (or held) that Sec-
tion 922 should be interpreted broadly to protect both external and internal
whistleblowers.
In the first reported decision interpreting the breadth of whistleblower
protection under Dodd–Frank, Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.,75 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York suggested in dicta that
internal whistleblowers could be entitled to Dodd–Frank antiretaliation pro-
tections.76 The court observed that limiting this section to external
whistleblowers would render the internal whistleblower protections in the
71. See, e.g., Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71945, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (holding that Dodd–Frank whistleblower protections
apply to internal whistleblowers); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2013);
Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d 986; Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (noting in dicta that Dodd–Frank whistleblower
protections apply regardless of whether an individual reports directly to the SEC or through
internal compliance programs); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47713 (S.D.N.Y. May 4), dismissed by No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103416 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
72. See Asadi, 720 F.3d 620.
73. See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 85–100 and accompanying text.
75. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713. In 2009, Patrick Egan, an employee at TradingScreen,
Inc., learned that the CEO of his company was diverting corporate assets to another company,
costing TradingScreen hundreds of thousands of dollars. Egan reported his concerns internally
but never reported the potential violations to the SEC. Egan was fired eight months later and
brought claims against TradingScreen seeking relief under Dodd–Frank. Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47713, at *1, *3–9.
76. See id. at *9–19.
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Antiretaliation Section superfluous.77 Thus, it argued that courts considering
Section 922 should interpret it broadly to cover both internal and external
whistleblowers.
A year later, the court’s observations were echoed by the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in Nollner v. Southern Baptist
Convention, Inc.78 The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s Dodd–Frank
claim, holding that the violations were not under the SEC’s jurisdiction.79 In
dicta, however, the court laid out a clear and concise summary of the mini-
mum showing a plaintiff must make to benefit from Dodd–Frank’s an-
tiretaliation protections:
(1) [the plaintiff] was retaliated against for reporting a violation of the
securities laws[;] (2) the plaintiff reported that information to the SEC or
to another entity (perhaps even internally) as appropriate; (3) the disclosure
was made pursuant to a law, rule, or regulation subject to the SEC’s juris-
diction; and (4) the disclosure was “required or protected” by that law,
rule, or regulation within the SEC’s jurisdiction.80
Although only dicta, this framework was later used by the federal district
court in Colorado to help decide the issue in that case.81 After the decisions
in Egan and Nollner hinted at this ambiguity in Dodd–Frank, the SEC
stepped in to provide its own guidance.
On June 13, 2011,82 the SEC promulgated rules adopting a broad inter-
pretation of Section 922 in an attempt to resolve the conflict between the
Definitions Section and the Antiretaliation Section.83 Shortly after these
rules were announced, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut decided Kramer v. Trans–Lux Corp.84 There, the court gave deference to
the SEC’s recent rulemaking and held85 that a broad interpretation of Section
77. Id. at *11.
78. 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 n.9 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). Like in Egan, the plaintiff in Nollner
claimed violations of Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower antiretaliation protections based on his
own internal reporting. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
79. Id. at 997 (“[T]he defendants are not . . . ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the SEC . . . .
Moreover, the violations reported by Mr. Nollner do not ‘relate to violations of the securities
laws’ . . . .”).
80. Id. at 995 (emphasis added).
81. See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
82. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304
(June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F, 249.1800–1801 (2013)).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2013). The SEC clarified that “[f]or purposes of the anti-
retaliation protections . . . [individuals are] whistleblower[s] if . . . [they] possess a reasonable
belief that the information [they] are providing relates to a possible securities law violation . . .
[and] provide that information in a manner described in [the Antiretaliation Section of
Dodd–Frank].” Id. (emphasis added).
84. No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
85. This was the first court actually to reach the issue of the scope of Dodd–Frank’s
whistleblower protections under Section 922. See Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, No. 12 Civ.
5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (listing cases).
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922’s whistleblower protections was appropriate.86 The Kramer court’s deci-
sion to follow the SEC’s guidance was based on the Supreme Court’s long-
standing doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambigu-
ous statutes—a doctrine it first articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.87 Applying Chevron’s two-part test,88 the
Kramer court determined that the statute was ambiguous, concluded that
the SEC’s interpretation was permissible, and thus adopted the agency’s
interpretation.89
The next reported case interpreting the scope of Dodd–Frank arose in
Colorado.90 In Genberg v. Porter, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado evaluated the plaintiff’s Dodd–Frank whistleblower claim follow-
ing the model laid out in Nollner.91 The court noted that the Antiretaliation
Section “is in direct conflict with the [Definitions Section] because it pro-
vides protection to persons who have not disclosed information to the
SEC.”92 The court’s recognition of the “direct conflict” in Section 922 both
reaffirmed that a broad interpretation was permissible93 and implicitly sanc-
tioned Kramer’s decision to defer to the SEC.
86. Kramer held that it was both appropriate to defer to the SEC’s interpretation of
Dodd–Frank’s antiretaliation protections and that the SEC’s broad interpretation was a per-
missible one. Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939, at *12–13 (“The SEC’s rule is a permissi-
ble construction of the Dodd–Frank Act, and, accordingly, [the court] must follow it.”).
87. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
88. Chevron set up a two-part test: If Congress has spoken directly on an issue, the
“court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. By contrast, if a statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to an issue, the court’s review is limited to whether or not the agency’s interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. In other words, if the statute is ambiguous,
“Chevron deference” requires courts to defer to the appropriate agency’s interpretations, as
long as those interpretations are permissible.
89. See Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939, at *10, *13.
90. See Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2013). In Genberg, the plaintiff
was fired for internally reporting that his company violated SEC rules by allowing its board of
directors to vote on corporate shares without guidance from its corporate shareholders. Id. at
1098–99.
91. Id. at 1105 (citing Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012)).
92. Id. at 1106 (emphasis added).
93. Consistent with Egan and Nollner, the court in Genberg held that applying
whistleblower antiretaliation protections only to external whistleblowers would effectively
render portions of the Antiretaliation Section meaningless. Id. Courts strive to avoid interpre-
tations that make any part of a statute moot. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 447 (10th Cir.
1992) (“The officers and directors offer a reading . . . contrary to the established principle of
statutory construction that ‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.’ ” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (5th ed.
1992))); Bridger Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
927 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Finally, and most recently, in Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC,94 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York evaluated the two compet-
ing interpretations of this section and concluded that although both were
permissible, neither was mandatory.95 The court looked to the trend in re-
cent case law,96 the basic tools of statutory construction, and the SEC’s
promulgated rules,97 paying particular attention to the SEC’s own explana-
tory comments.98 Under the SEC’s view, the antiretaliation provisions of
Dodd–Frank clearly apply to individuals regardless of whether they report to
the SEC.99 And “because the SEC’s rule clarifies an ambiguous statutory
scheme . . . and reflects the considerable experience and expertise that the
agency has acquired over time with respect to interpretation and enforce-
ment of the securities laws,” the court followed Kramer and deferred to the
SEC’s interpretation.100
These five cases demonstrate the judicial history of the broad interpreta-
tion of Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protections: recognition of the conflict
in Egan; a framework for proving an antiretaliation claim in Nollner; defer-
ence to the SEC in Kramer; affirmation of the statutory conflict in Genberg;
and, finally, a comprehensive synthesis of the case law and deference to the
SEC’s final rules in Murray. These textual, structural, and agency-deference
interpretations of the statute are all reasonable. Yet none of the courts’ anal-
yses focused on the remedial purpose of Dodd–Frank—particularly as re-
flected in the Act’s whistleblower protections—despite the Supreme Court
precedent to do so.
94. This is the most recent district court case regarding the scope of Section 922. See
infra note 96.
95. No. 12 Civ. 5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). Thus,
the court found that the statute was ambiguous. Id. at *13–15; cf. Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase
& Co., 498 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that competing permissible interpretations of
a statute demonstrate that the statutory text is ambiguous); PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362
F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that simply because a statute “is susceptible of one
construction does not render its meaning plain if it is also susceptible of another, plausible
construction”).
96. Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945, at *8 (“[F]our other district court judges have
confronted this exact issue, and each one has endorsed [a broad] reading of the statute.”).
97. Id. at *8–9.
98. Id. at *9 (“[F]or purposes of the anti-retaliation protections, an individual must pro-
vide the information in a manner described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A). This change to the rule
reflects the fact that the statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three different categories
of whistleblowers, and the third category includes individuals who report to persons or govern-
mental authorities other than the Commission.” (quoting Securities Whistleblower Incentives
and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R § 240.21F
(2013))) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
99. Id. at *10–11.
100. Id. at *20–21.
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C. The Fifth Circuit Narrowly Interpreted Section 922 Based Purely on
the Text
While the five district courts have interpreted Section 922 broadly
enough to allow for antiretaliation protections for both internal and external
whistleblowers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently took
a much narrower approach, holding that Dodd–Frank antiretaliation pro-
tections should apply only to external whistleblowers. This Section will first
articulate how the Fifth Circuit justified its narrow interpretation and then
explain why the court’s reasoning is ultimately unpersuasive.
Although the Fifth Circuit recognized that other courts, as well as the
SEC, had interpreted Dodd–Frank to protect both types of whistleblowers, it
held that the statute unambiguously determined both “who is protected[ ]
and . . . what actions by protected individuals constitute protected activ-
ity.”101 The Fifth Circuit held that the protections offered under the An-
tiretaliation Section extend only to individuals who meet the external
reporting requirements of the Definitions Section; and the latter section
merely describes a set of protected activities for individuals who have already
achieved whistleblower status by reporting to the SEC.102 By reading the Def-
initions Section as a gateway through which an individual must pass in or-
der to enjoy the protections of the Antiretaliation Section, the Fifth Circuit
found no conflict in the statute.103 The court relied heavily on the word
“whistleblower” in the Antiretaliation Section and maintained that had Con-
gress intended this section to provide protections for all individuals making
internal disclosures, it would have used the term “individual” or “employee”
rather than “whistleblower.”104
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument that a narrow interpreta-
tion of Section 922 would impermissibly render portions of the Antiretalia-
tion Section superfluous.105 To counter this criticism, the court imagined a
hypothetical situation that allowed both sections to come into play without
making each other moot. In this hypothetical, an individual would simulta-
neously report violations internally to his superiors and externally to the
SEC.106 The employee’s manager would only be aware of the internal report-
ing and would subsequently fire the employee solely in retaliation for that
101. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2013).
102. Id. at 625.
103. Id. at 626 (“Conflict would exist between these statutory provisions only if we read
the three categories of protected activity as additional definitions of three types of
whistleblowers.”).
104. Id.; see also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (noting that the “normal rule of
statutory construction assumes that ‘ “identical words used in different parts of the same act
are intended to have the same meaning.” ’ ” (quoting Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S.
851, 860 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627.
106. Id.
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reporting.107 The Fifth Circuit noted that without the internal reporting pro-
tections in the Antiretaliation Section, this hypothetical employee would not
be protected because the manager did not base the termination decision on
the protected external reporting.108
To bolster this argument, the court went a step further and suggested
that interpreting Section 922 broadly would actually render the SOX an-
tiretaliation provisions moot.109 If Dodd–Frank provided the exact same pro-
tections as SOX by protecting internal whistleblowers, and if Dodd–Frank’s
incentives were so much stronger, then no employee would ever bring a SOX
antiretaliation claim. As a result, Section 806 of SOX would be superfluous.
This was a particularly clever argument because it took a major concern
voiced by each of the district courts and turned it on its head. In response to
the district courts’ arguments that a narrow definition of “whistleblower”
would make the Antiretaliation Section superfluous, the Fifth Circuit as-
serted that a broad interpretation of Section 922 would make the Definitions
Section (as well as SOX’s own antiretaliation protections) superfluous.110
Finally, the Fifth Circuit attempted to dispose of the issue of Chevron
deference by holding that Dodd–Frank unambiguously required individuals
to report violations to the SEC in order to qualify for antiretaliation protec-
tions. Thus, there was no need to defer to the SEC’s final rule purporting to
reconcile the two sections at issue.111 The Fifth Circuit also criticized the
SEC’s interpretive rule as being inconsistent, noting that “[w]hile 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-2(b)(1) appears to adopt a broader definition of ‘whistleblower[ ]’
. . . 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9, which governs the procedures for submitting
original information to the SEC, explicitly requires that an individual submit
information about a possible securities law violation to the SEC.”112 Thus,
even if the court had found that the statute was ambiguous, it would not
have deferred to the SEC’s interpretation because the interpretation was not
reasonable. In such a situation, the court would remain free to adopt its own
(narrow) interpretation of Section 922.113
107. Id.
108. Id. at 627–28.
109. Id. at 628–29 (explaining that when given the choice of either a SOX claim or a
Dodd–Frank claim, an individual would likely not raise a SOX claim because Dodd–Frank
provides stronger protections and greater incentives).
110. The Fifth Circuit does not further elaborate on this particular argument in the case,
but this Note contends that this is a logical reading of it.
111. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 (holding that not only does the court not need to follow the
SEC’s interpretation but that “[b]ecause Congress has directly addressed the precise question
at issue, we must reject the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term ‘whistleblower’ for
purposes of the whistleblower-protection provision” (emphasis added)).
112. Id.
113. See id. (“The SEC’s inconsistency in defining the term ‘whistleblower’ for purposes of
the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection provision does not strengthen Asadi’s position that
the SEC’s interpretation ‘reasonably effectuate[s] Congress’s intent.’ ” (alteration in original)
(quoting Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2007))).
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The Fifth Circuit is the outlier in its textual and structural analysis of
Section 922, and its arguments for the narrow interpretation are not persua-
sive. To be sure, the first argument—that Congress used the term
“whistleblower” rather than “individual” for a reason—does support a nar-
row interpretation of the section, but this argument does not resolve the
section’s overall ambiguity and conflict. The district courts’ main concern—
that a narrow interpretation of Section 922 would make the internal
whistleblower protections in the Antiretaliation Section superfluous—re-
mains valid because there are no realistic scenarios for those particular pro-
tections to apply under a narrow construction of the statute. The Fifth
Circuit discusses one such scenario in its opinion, but it has to bend over
backwards to conjure a hypothetical that gives meaning to both the Defini-
tions Section and Antiretaliation Section under its narrow interpretation of
Section 922.
In the Fifth Circuit’s hypothetical, an employee simultaneously reports
internally and externally and is then fired solely based on his internal report-
ing. In this unlikely scenario, the employee would have to be willing to ad-
mit openly to his superiors that a potential violation had taken place, and he
would also have to disclose secretly this same violation to the SEC. Further,
the manager would have to be—and would have to persuade a court that he
was—unaware of the external reporting,114 even though his employee appar-
ently (and misguidedly) trusted him enough to report the violation inter-
nally. Most significantly, the majority of incentives for and benefits of
internal whistleblowing—displaying loyalty to one’s company and allowing
for quick, efficient, and private resolutions of violations—are absent in this
scenario because the employee has also reported to the SEC. Thus, it is hard
to imagine what motivations would prompt the employee to make this in-
ternal disclosure at all.115 The Fifth Circuit is also unable to point to any
concrete examples of such a situation ever occurring.116 Congress certainly
did not envision this type of scenario when it drafted Dodd–Frank.
Even if presumed true, the Fifth Circuit’s third argument—that a broad
interpretation could render other sections of Dodd–Frank and SOX moot—
does not make the district courts’ concerns about the drawbacks of a narrow
114. Asadi attempts to legitimize this scenario in a footnote:
Under 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–9(a), “[t]o be considered a whistleblower . . . , you must
submit your information about a possible securities law violation by either of these meth-
ods: (1) Online, through the Commission’s Web site . . . ; or (2) By mailing or faxing a
Form TCR (Tip, Complaint or Referral) . . . to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower . . . .”
Regardless of which of these two methods a whistleblower utilizes to submit information
to the SEC, the whistleblower’s employer will not necessarily immediately be aware of the
disclosure, unless of course, the whistleblower informs her employer that she has made
such a disclosure.
Id. at 627 n.10 (alterations in original). The court, however, says nothing about the likelihood
of such a scenario ever arising.
115. See supra notes 10–11, 37–39, and infra notes 163–164 and accompanying text for
the benefits of internal whistleblowing.
116. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627–28.
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interpretation any less valid.117 It simply demonstrates that both the broad
and narrow interpretations of Section 922 threaten to make other laws moot
but does not provide any reason (other than the court’s far-fetched hypo-
thetical) for accepting one interpretation over the other. If anything, this
third argument simply reinforces the idea that the statute is ambiguously
drafted, which in turn suggests that the Fifth Circuit should have respected
the principle of Chevron deference and looked to the SEC’s interpretation.118
The Fifth Circuit’s final argument—that the SEC’s interpretation is in-
consistent and thus would fail step two of Chevron—is its least persuasive.
The court asserts that the SEC’s own rules are inconsistent because the SEC
maintains that to be considered a whistleblower, individuals must submit
information to the SEC.119 But the agency is not being inconsistent here. It is
merely providing whistleblowers a route to comply with the requirement of
the Definitions Section to report information to the SEC “in a manner es-
tablished, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”120 This portion of the
SEC’s rule simply tries to identify the methods that individuals can use to
become whistleblowers by reporting to the SEC (i.e., external
whistleblowers). The rule does not provide that individuals can only become
whistleblowers by following such methods.
III. Courts Can Follow the Supreme Court’s Guidance in Herman
Without Violating the Canons of Statutory Construction
The six courts that have tackled this issue employed various tools of
statutory interpretation to reach their conclusions, but none of them fo-
cused on the remedial purpose for which Dodd–Frank was enacted. Section
III.A will first outline the Supreme Court’s holding in Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston: remedial statutes should be broadly and flexibly interpreted.
Section III.B will then argue that the text and structure of Section 922 per-
mit a broad interpretation under Herman. Section III.C will explain that the
legislative history of Dodd–Frank does not help clarify Congress’s intent re-
garding the scope of whistleblower protections. Finally, Section III.D will
argue that the Herman Rule can be used in conjunction with step two of
Chevron as a justification for finding that the SEC’s interpretation of
Dodd–Frank was reasonable. This Note concludes that maintaining protec-
tions for internal whistleblowers is crucial to the success of Dodd–Frank and
117. Either interpretation could purportedly render another portion of the same statutory
scheme superfluous, and “the canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation
would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.” Marx v. Gen. Revenue
Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1178 (2013).
118. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
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that courts should therefore use a broad and flexible approach in interpret-
ing Section 922—and Dodd–Frank more generally—as long as the text per-
mits such as approach.
A. Remedial Securities Regulations Should Be Broadly and
Flexibly Interpreted
The history of interpreting remedial statutes dates back to English com-
mon law at the time of America’s founding.121 The general rule (the “Her-
man Rule”) is that remedial statutes should be interpreted broadly and
flexibly.122 The Supreme Court has referred to this rule as recently as 2002.123
Moreover, various circuit courts continue to employ the rule frequently
when interpreting securities regulations.124 In Herman, the Supreme Court
explicitly supported broad constructions of remedial legislation in the con-
text of securities regulations: “[W]e have repeatedly recognized that securi-
ties laws combating fraud should be construed ‘not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’ ”125 But ap-
plication of the Herman Rule is itself limited by the text of the statute to
which it is applied.126 Therefore, to determine if the antiretaliation protec-
tions in Section 922 Dodd–Frank should be interpreted broadly based on
Herman, courts should determine if Dodd–Frank is a remedial securities
statute and whether the text allows for a broad, remedial interpretation.
In the case of Dodd–Frank’s antiretaliation protections, it is reasonable
for courts to follow the Herman Rule because Dodd–Frank is a remedial
securities regulation. As noted in Part I, Dodd–Frank was enacted following
the 2008 financial crisis.127 And, perhaps more pointedly, recent case law
implies that securities whistleblower protections are indeed remedial regula-
tions. In a 2014 case, Lawson v. FMR LLC, the Supreme Court considered a
121. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *87 (“There are three points to be con-
sidered in the construction of all remedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy
. . . [a]nd it is the business of the judges so to construe the act, as to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy.”).
122. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983); Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (“Congress intended . . . securities legislation ‘enacted for the pur-
pose of avoiding frauds,’ not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.” (footnote omitted)); see also Rudolph H. Heimanson, Remedial Legislation, 46
Marq. L. Rev. 216, 218 (1962).
123. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).
124. See, e.g., Gomes v. Am. Century Cos., 710 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2013); Lawson v.
FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 76 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); SEC v. J.W. Barclay &
Co., 442 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 2006).
125. Herman, 459 U.S. at 386–87 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
126. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978) (“[W]e would not be inclined to read [reme-
dial securities legislation] more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably
permit.”).
127. Recent Legislation, supra note 17, at 1829.
142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:121
matter involving SOX whistleblower protections.128 Similar to the courts in-
terpreting Section 922, the Court in Lawson addressed which individuals
were covered by SOX’s whistleblower antiretaliation protections. Specifically,
the Court considered whether SOX provides whistleblower protections only
for individuals directly employed by a covered (public) company or whether
the protections extend to employees of privately held contractors and sub-
contractors.129 The Court ultimately reversed the First Circuit’s holding and
interpreted the SOX whistleblower protections broadly to cover such con-
tractors.130 Throughout the opinion, the Court repeatedly recognized that
SOX was designed to remedy the causes that precipitated the financial col-
lapses of institutions like Enron.131 Even the First Circuit’s narrow—and
overruled—interpretation recognized SOX’s remedial nature and specifically
referenced the Herman Rule.132
In light of the Court’s decision in Lawson, then, there are several reasons
to suggest that Section 922 is remedial legislation and that courts should
therefore follow the Herman Rule and consider the section’s remedial pur-
pose insofar as the text permits it. First, questions concerning the
whistleblower antiretaliation protections under Dodd–Frank are materially
similar to the questions addressed in Lawson, and the Court in that case felt
compelled to address the remedial nature of SOX. Second, Section 922’s
whistleblower provisions were enacted to improve SOX’s whistleblower pro-
tections, which were, after all, the subject of the Court’s decision in Lawson.
Third, Dodd–Frank was generally enacted in response to a financial crisis,
much like SOX and the Securities Exchange Act. Finally, although the Su-
preme Court in Lawson did not rule on Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protec-
tions, the Court did hint that it might prove amenable to a broad
interpretation of those provisions as well.133
128. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014), rev’g 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012).
129. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1165.
130. Id. (“We hold . . . that the provision shelters employees of private contractors and
subcontractors, just as it shelters employees of the public company served by the contractors
and subcontractors.”).
131. E.g., id. at 1162 (“In the Enron scandal that prompted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
. . . .”); id. at 1168 (“[C]onsider whether a Congress, prompted by the Enron debacle, would
exclude from whistleblower protection countless professionals equipped to bring fraud on in-
vestors to a halt.”); id. at 1169 (“Our textual analysis . . . fits the provision’s purpose. It is
common ground that Congress installed whistleblower protection in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
as one means to ward off another Enron debacle.”).
132. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 76 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Court has stated that
‘securities laws combating fraud should be construed “not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.” ’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983))), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).
133. See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1175 (“If anything relevant to our inquiry can be gleaned
from Dodd–Frank, it is that Congress apparently does not share FMR’s concerns about ex-
tending protection comprehensively to corporate whistleblowers.”). Although the Court
hinted in dicta that it might limit Dodd–Frank’s antiretaliation protections to external
whistleblowers, the Court should consider the guidance in Herman and interpret Section 922
broadly. Id. (“FMR, we note, somewhat overstates Dodd–Frank’s coverage. . . . Dodd–Frank’s
whistleblower provision . . . focuses primarily on reporting to federal authorities.”).
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B. The Text and Structure of Section 922 Are Consistent with a Broad
Interpretation and Do Not Limit the Application of the
Herman Rule
Although the Herman Rule may be applicable to the antiretaliation pro-
visions in Dodd–Frank, the analysis cannot end with a simple inquiry into
whether Dodd–Frank’s provisions are suitably remedial. The Herman Rule
alone cannot rewrite a statute. As the Supreme Court noted, “The broad
remedial goals of [a securities law] are insufficient justification for interpret-
ing a specific provision ‘ “more broadly than its language and the statutory
scheme reasonably permit.” ’ ”134 Even though a remedial purpose is both
indicative of congressional intent and can set the stage for broad interpreta-
tions of Section 922, courts must ultimately look to the language of the
section to determine how broad of an interpretation may be reasonable.
Two basic maxims of textual statutory construction are particularly apt
for interpreting the provisions at issue. First, when interpreting a statute, the
actual language of the text should be the starting place. Second, language
should generally be interpreted according to its plain or ordinary mean-
ing135—although the meaning of language will always depend on its
context.136
1. The Text and Structure of Section 922 Reasonably Support a
Broad Interpretation
First, for courts even to consider the Herman Rule in this situation, a
broad interpretation must be reasonable based on the text of Section 922. In
Section 922, the Definitions Section defines a whistleblower as a covered
individual who reports a potential violation to the SEC.137 Thus, when read
in isolation, the plain text of the Definitions Section appears to limit
whistleblowers to individuals who report directly to the SEC. The An-
tiretaliation Section, however, protects whistleblowers who provide informa-
tion directly to the SEC as well as those whistleblowers who make
disclosures that are “required or protected” under the Securities Exchange
Act, under any law, rule, or regulation within the SEC’s jurisdiction, and
under SOX.138 And SOX protects whistleblowing disclosures that are made
134. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1978)).
135. E.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)
(“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the as-
sumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative pur-
pose.” (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted))); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (commenting that
usually “the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent”); People v. Rissley,
795 N.E.2d 174, 180 (Ill. 2003) (“[T]he language of the statute is the best indication of the
legislative intent.”).
136. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
138. Id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
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internally. Consequently, within the broader context of the statute as a whole,
it is far less clear who qualifies as a Dodd–Frank whistleblower.
Of the six courts that have interpreted the scope of “whistleblower”
under this statute, three district courts found a textual basis for a broad
interpretation, two district courts balked at the conflict and deferred to the
SEC’s interpretation, and the one circuit court found no conflict and held
that there was a textual basis for a narrow interpretation.139
The courts in Egan, Nollner, and Genberg based their reasoning prima-
rily on the text and structure of Section 922. Each of these courts relied on
the logic of TRW Inc. v. Andrews, where the Supreme Court held that “a
statute ought, upon the whole . . . be so construed that, if it can be pre-
vented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignifi-
cant.”140 These courts found that defining “whistleblower” solely using the
Definitions Section would invalidate substantial portions of the Antiretalia-
tion Section,141 and therefore they all interpreted the section broadly. These
courts’ approaches support the idea that the text and structure of Section
922 are flexible and thus that the courts could have applied the Herman Rule
here.
2. Courts That Find the Text and Structure of Section 922 Ambiguous
Can Defer to the SEC’s Interpretation
It is also reasonable to view the antiretaliation provisions as flexible
under an agency-deference approach to statutory interpretation. In Kramer
and Murray, the district courts found a clear conflict in the text of Section
922.142 Murray specifically held that both broad and narrow constructions of
139. See supra Part II. The defendants in Kramer offered a fourth interpretation, but
neither the SEC nor any of the courts that have ruled on this issue adopt or even address this
ultranarrow interpretation. See Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136939, at *8–9 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (“Trans-Lux argues that the retaliation
provision applies only to those individuals who are both (a) a whistleblower under section
78u-6(a)(6), and (b) have engaged in one of the protected activities listed in section 78u-
6(h)(1)(A).”).
140. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 174 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp.
2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994
(M.D. Tenn. 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47713, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. May 4), dismissed by No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103416 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
141. Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (“[T]he defendants’ interpretation of
[Dodd–Frank] would render § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) inoperable and moot. . . . § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii) should be interpreted as an exception to the whistleblower definition found in
§ 78u-6(a)(6).”); Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (“[T]he court must read part (iii) of the anti-
retaliation provisions in conjunction with the definition of whistleblower.”); Egan, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *12 (“The contradictory provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act are best
harmonized by reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of certain whistleblower
disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the SEC.”).
142. See supra Section II.B.
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“whistleblower” were reasonable but that the very existence of these compet-
ing interpretations demonstrated that Section 922 was ambiguous.143 Kramer
found that it was ambiguous whether Congress intended for “whistleblower”
to be narrowly construed since a narrow reading was inconsistent with
Dodd–Frank’s general purpose.144 That both courts deemed the statute am-
biguous sufficed to persuade them to move to step two of Chevron, which
entailed an assessment of whether the SEC’s interpretation of
“whistleblower” was reasonable.145 The courts did in fact conclude that the
SEC’s regulations represented a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and
therefore they deferred to the SEC’s view that the whistleblower provisions
protected both internally and externally reporting individuals.146
Importantly, neither deference to the SEC nor interpretations of the text
and structure of Section 922 would have barred any of these courts from
applying the Herman Rule to Dodd–Frank’s antiretaliation provisions. In an
agency-deference statutory approach, the Herman Rule would be useful at
step two of Chevron. If the respective agency chooses to interpret an ambigu-
ous securities regulation broadly and flexibly, the Herman Rule would sup-
port the argument that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. And under
a textual or structural approach, the Herman Rule is consistent with the
broad holdings of the district courts.147 Of course, the Fifth Circuit’s narrow
construction of Section 922 would bar the Herman Rule, but, as discussed
above,148 the court’s reasoning is unpersuasive.
A statutory construction of Section 922 does not necessarily end with
the provision’s text and structure, however. If the ambiguity can be resolved
by utilizing other tools of statutory construction, then there is no need to
defer to the SEC’s interpretation.149 In addition to looking at the language
and structure of Section 922, courts should therefore consider the legislative
intent behind the statute at issue.150
143. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945, at
*13–14 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
144. See Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939, at *10–11.
145. See Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945, at *15; Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136939, at *12.
146. See Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945, at *20–21 (“[T]his Court defers to the
SEC’s interpretation.”); Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939, at *13 (“The SEC’s rule is a
permissible construction of the Dodd-Frank Act, and, accordingly, I must follow it.”).
147. See supra Section II.B.
148. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
149. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)
(“[Courts] should not disturb [an agency’s interpretation] unless it appears from the statute or
its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961))).
150. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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C. The Legislative History of Dodd–Frank Provides Little Guidance on
How Courts Should Interpret Section 922
When interpreting a statute, courts should also consider the legislative
intent behind a provision.151 If the legislative history clearly reveals a prefer-
ence that can resolve the ambiguity in Section 922, then the courts need not
defer to the SEC. Thus, to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue,”152 or if, instead, there is sufficient ambiguity
to move to step two of Chevron, courts should investigate the legislative his-
tory of Dodd–Frank. Unfortunately, the Act’s legislative history is not par-
ticularly illuminating regarding the scope of whistleblower antiretaliation
protections.153
There was some legislative debate, particularly in the Senate, addressing
both whistleblower protections in general and the specific antiretaliation
measures at issue, but Congress said comparatively little about internal ver-
sus external whistleblowers. During the days before the Senate passed
Dodd–Frank, several senators made floor speeches specifically addressing
the whistleblower protections in the Act. Leahy expressed his support for the
whistleblower protections,154 and Cardin similarly voiced his appreciation
for the antiretaliation provisions.155 Through these statements, the Senate
indicated its support for the whistleblower protections in general and for the
protections in the Antiretaliation Section more specifically.156 Yet there is no
mention of the specific issue of internal versus external whistleblowing.
On the same day that Senators Leahy and Akaka made their statements,
Senator Reed noted as follows: “I also support the establishment of a pro-
gram to reward whistleblowers when the SEC brings significant enforcement
actions based upon original information provided by the whistleblower, and
I look forward to the SEC rules that will detail the framework for this pro-
gram.”157 Unfortunately, at best, this demonstrates Reed’s support for exter-
nal whistleblowing, without giving any indication about his thoughts on the
overall breadth of Section 922 and whether internal whistleblowing would
be permitted. Because the legislative history of Dodd–Frank does not resolve
the ambiguity that the Kramer and Murray courts found in the text and
structure of the whistleblower protection provisions, these courts were justi-
fied in proceeding to Chevron step two. And had the Fifth Circuit found
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
152. Id. at 842.
153. Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 4)
(“The legislative history of the Act provides little evidence of Congress’s purpose.”), dismissed
by No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103416 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
154. See supra note 59.
155. See supra note 58.
156. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5929 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd)
(“Congress intends that the SEC make awards that are sufficiently robust to motivate potential
whistleblowers to share their information and to overcome the fear of risk of the loss of their
positions.”).
157. Id. at S5916 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed).
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ambiguity, it too would have been equally justified in moving to step two of
this test.
D. Courts That Find Conflict and Ambiguity in Section 922 Should Defer
to the SEC’s Interpretation
As mentioned in Part II, the first step of Chevron entails determining
whether the statute or provision at issue is ambiguous. Courts will typically
use basic tools of statutory construction (i.e., the text, structure, purpose,
and legislative history of a statute) to determine whether it is ambiguous.158
Because neither the text, structure, nor legislative history of Section 922 was
sufficient to resolve the issue for the Kramer and Murray courts, they appro-
priately moved to step two of the test to determine whether the agency’s
interpretation was permissible. And it is at this step of Chevron that courts
can strengthen and legitimize their holdings by citing the Herman Rule.
The Kramer and Murray courts both determined that the SEC’s inter-
pretation was reasonable, although they reached this conclusion for different
reasons. The Kramer court referred to the purpose of Dodd–Frank, but it
did so briefly, superficially, and without any explanation for why a purpose-
based interpretation is justified: “[T]he Dodd–Frank Act appears to have
been intended to expand upon the protections of Sarbanes–Oxley.”159 If the
court had followed up by citing Herman, or even the basic principle of Her-
man that remedial statutes should be interpreted flexibly, it would have
made a much more compelling argument.
Murray relied on the holdings of prior courts to find that the SEC’s
interpretation was in fact reasonable: “[It] compels the conclusion, at step
two of the Chevron [test], that the SEC’s interpretation is a reasonable one.
After all, its rule is consistent with the interpretation of the statutory provi-
sions put forth by Egan, Nollner, Kramer, and Genberg . . . .”160 Murray noted
that its initial holding—that there were two permissible but conflicting in-
terpretations of the statute—had two implications. First, it was appropriate
to follow Chevron and defer to the SEC’s interpretation. Second, because the
SEC’s interpretation comported with one of the permissible interpretations
(the district courts’ broad interpretation),161 the SEC’s interpretation was
reasonable. Murray held that the broad interpretation of Section 922 is rea-
sonable in order to meet the first prong of Chevron because it conflicts with
158. Lee v. Holder, 701 F.3d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939, at
*1, *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
160. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945, at
*15 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
161. Id. at *13–14 (“No doubt this [broad] reading of the two statutory provisions is
permissible, but as Egan, Nollner, Kramer, and Genberg make clear, it is by no means
mandatory.”).
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the narrow interpretation and thus is ambiguous. The court then relied on
that same finding to meet the second prong. Thus, Murray ultimately justi-
fied the SEC’s interpretation by pointing to the fact that the interpretation is
consistent with the conclusions of previous courts. By explaining that its
holding was consistent with Herman, Murray could have bolstered its con-
clusion that the SEC’s interpretation was reasonable and thus presented an
independent basis for meeting the second prong of Chevron.
The Kramer and Murray courts’ deference to the SEC was appropriate
because—even after applying traditional tools of statutory construction—
there was ambiguity in the antiretaliation provisions. But the courts’ hold-
ings would have been more convincing, and better grounded in precedent, if
they had found an independent basis for the SEC’s interpretation. This Note
argues that the Herman Rule can be applied in this situation to provide a
sufficient, and precedentially strong, basis for a broad interpretation of
“whistleblower.” The holdings in Kramer and Murray only further highlight
the flexibility in the antiretaliation provisions while demonstrating that the
tools of statutory construction are insufficient to resolve the ambiguity that
arises from this flexibility. Therefore, the Herman Rule serves as an appro-
priate tool of construction, and lower courts should defer to the Supreme
Court’s guidance that remedial statutes be interpreted as broadly as the text
and structure reasonably permit.
Conclusion
The complicated text and structure of Section 922 make determining
the scope of Dodd–Frank whistleblower protections a challenging task for
courts. Fortunately, courts can turn to the Herman Rule to support a broad
interpretation. Because the text and structure of Section 922 do not bar ap-
plication of Herman, and because the reasonableness of the SEC’s interpreta-
tion can be validated by Herman, courts should use this rule to justify a
broad interpretation of Dodd–Frank regardless of which method of statu-
tory interpretation they employ.
A robust and effective corporate internal reporting system provides a
variety of benefits to companies, regulators, and the general public. (And
most initial whistleblowing is internal.)162 Strong protections for internal re-
porting would allow and encourage people with specialized knowledge or
expertise to find potential violations, report them, and subsequently remedy
them quickly and effectively.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpre-
tation of Section 922, potential whistleblowers might skip internal reporting
and go directly to the SEC—or at least do both simultaneously—which
162. See Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs, Orga-
nizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 Acad. Mgmt. J.
687, 700–01 (1984).
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would still produce all of the drawbacks that come with external report-
ing.163 Interpretations that promote internal reporting would therefore be
more consistent with Dodd–Frank’s remedial purpose. If internal reporting
is not protected and encouraged, companies could lose out on the benefits
of fixing violations internally, regulators could be overwhelmed by an influx
of complaints, and investors might lose confidence either in the financial
sector due to news of repeated SEC sanctions or in the regulatory system
itself due to the SEC’s inability effectively to punish and deter securities
violations.164
If the Court does take up this issue in the future, it should use Herman
either to directly interpret Section 922 in a broad fashion or to find that the
SEC’s interpretation is reasonable under Chevron and hence defer to the
SEC—an institution far better equipped than the Court to tackle the com-
plex issue of whistleblower antiretaliation protections.
163. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Dodd–Frank and Whistleblower Protection: Who Qualifies?,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2013, at 5.
164. Recent Legislation, supra note 17, at 1835 (“[P]otential circumvention of internal
reporting could have vast costs and indeed could undermine the very goal that section 922 was
enacted to promote—the effective and efficient detection of securities law violations.”).
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